

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

ERDE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W

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O 091549Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1006

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 7953

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PARM, US, UR

SUBJECT: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS PLENARY NUMBER SIX

TTBT/PNE DELEGATION MESSAGE NUMBER FIFTEEN

1. THESE ARE TEXTS OF US PREPARED STATEMENTS IN PLENARY
JUNE 9.

2. BUCHEIN: BEGIN TEXT:

GOOD AFTERNOON. I BELIEVE THE U.S. SIDE HAS THE CHAIR TODAY.

THIS IS THE FIRST OF THE SERIES OF MEETINGS TO BE HELD
DURING THIS WEEK AND NEXT TO CLARIFY TECHNICAL ISSUES IDENTIFIED
IN MEETINGS LAST WEEK.

BEFORE STARTING THIS SERIES OF TECHNICAL EXPLORATIONS, THE
U.S. SIDE WISHES TO FULFILL OUR COMMITMENT TO MAKE A STATEMENT
TODAY COMMENTING ON DR. MYASNIKOV'S STATEMENT OF JUNE 6 ON
EXCAVATION PNES. THAT STATEMENT WILL BE PRESENTED BY DR.
HECKROTTE. END TEXT.

3. HECKROTTE: BEGIN TEXT:

MR. TIMERBAEV, WE LISTENED WITH INTEREST TO DR. MYASNIKOV'S
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PRESENTATION OF THE SOVIET SIDE'S VIEW ON YIELD LIMITS FOR

EXCAVATION PNES AND THE ASSOCIATED VERIFICATION PROCEDURES. DR. MYASNIKOV'S PRINCIPAL POINTS RELATED TO (A) THE LIMIT ON YIELDS OF INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS, (B) A FISSION YIELD LIMIT AND RELATED VERIFICATION PROCEDURES, AND (C) A RESTRICTION ON MINIMUM DEPTH-OF-BURIAL.

IT IS OUR VIEW THAT THESE LIMITATIONS AND VERIFICATION PROCEDURES AS WELL AS OTHERS MUST BE DESIGNED SO THAT BOTH SIDES CAN BE ASSURED THAT EXCAVATION PNES DO NOT PROVIDE WEAPONS-RELATED BENEFITS OTHERWISE PRECLUDED OR LIMITED BY THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY.

IN OUR EXPOSITION OF THE US POSITION ON EXCAVATION PNES IN ROUND II WE STATED THAT WE HAD ASSESSED A NUMBER OF FACTORS IN THE LIGHT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY TO ARRIVE AT AN INTEGRATED SET OF PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS WHICH COULD CONSTRAIN THE POTENTIAL OF EXCAVATION PNES TO PRODUCE WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS TO A DEGREE CONSISTENT WITH THE LIMITATION ESTABLISHED IN THE TREATY OF JULY 3, 1974. OUR APPROACH TO THESE QUESTIONS REMAINS THE SAME AND IT IS IN LIGHT OF THIS FACT THAT I WILL COMMENT BRIEFLY ON DR. MYASNIKOV'S PRESENTATION.

THE SPECIFIC VALUE OF A LIMIT ON YIELDS OF INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS IS STILL A MATTER UPON WHICH WE NEED TO SEEK AGREEMENT. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS PROPOSED THAT THIS YIELD LIMIT BE 500 KILOTONS. WE SAID IN THE LAST ROUND THAT WE BELIEVE THIS IS TOO HIGH. MOREOVER, I NOTE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE STILL CALLS FOR A LIMITED NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS WITH YIELDS HIGHER THAN THIS GENERAL LIMIT. IT IS OUR POSITION THAT WHATEVER THE VALUE OF THE AGREED LIMIT ON INDIVIDUAL YIELDS, THERE CAN BE NO EXCEPTIONS TO THIS LIMITATION. TO PERMIT EXCEPTIONS WOULD DEFEAT THE PURPOSE OF THE LIMITATION.

DR. MYASNIKOV BEGAN HIS PRESENTATION WITH THE STATEMENT THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS YIELD LIMITS ON INDIVIDUAL AND SALVO OR GROUP EXPLOSIONS. HOWEVER, WE DID NOT FIND ANY MENTION IN HIS REMARKS OF A LIMIT ON AGGREGATE YIELDS OF GROUPS. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION ACCEPTS THE PRINCIPLE OF AN AGGREGATE YIELD LIMIT. IT IS THE US POSITION THAT THERE MUST BE AN AGGREGATE YIELD LIMIT. THE US POSITION IS THAT

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THIS LIMIT SHOULD BE 500 KT.

ON THE SUBJECT OF A FISSION YIELD LIMIT FOR EXCAVATION DEVICES DR. MYASNIKOV SAID THERE WAS NO NEED FOR SUCH A LIMIT ON EXPLOSIONS OF LESS THAN 150 KILOTONS. ABOVE 150 KILOTONS HE SAID THAT A FISSION YIELD LIMIT MIGHT BE A CRITERION FOR VERIFICATION. WE UNDERSTOOD YOUR STATEMENTS IN THE LAST ROUND TO BE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE UNDERSTOOD THE REASON FOR SUCH A LIMITATION,

AND THAT THE SPECIFIC NUMERICAL VALUE OF 0.2 KILOTON PROPOSED BY THE US GAVE THE SOVIET SIDE NO TECHNICAL PROBLEM. DR. MYASNIKOV'S REMARKS, HOWEVER, LEAD US TO ASK WHETHER THE SOVIET SIDE MAY HAVE SOME RESERVATION ABOUT THE FISSION YIELD LIMIT AS A VERIFICATION CRITERION.

DURING THE RECESS THE US MADE AN EXTENSIVE ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE VERIFICATION OF THE FISSION YIELD LIMIT. WE HAVE STUDIED CAREFULLY THE METHOD DESCRIBED BY DR. PETROV IN THE LAST ROUND. IT IS OUR CONSIDERED VIEW THAT THIS METHOD CANNOT ADEQUATELY VERIFY A FISSION YIELD LIMIT. IT IS OUR EVALUATION THAT THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF MELT SAMPLES, WHICH WAS ALSO DESCRIBED BY DR. PETROV IN THE LAST ROUND, IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN THE VERIFICATION OF THE FISSION YIELD LIMIT. VERIFICATION OF A FISSION YIELD LIMIT BY THE COLLECTION OF MELT SAMPLES AND SUPPORTING COLLATERAL INFORMATION SOURCES REMAIN AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE US POSITION. THESE ARE MATTERS WHICH CAN VERY USEFULLY BE DISCUSSED BY THE EXPERTS.

WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION ON A MINIMUM DEPTH-OF-BURIAL, DR. MYASNIKOV SAID THIS MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR VERY LARGE EXCAVATION YIELDS. NO INDICATION WAS GIVEN HOWEVER, AS TO WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE A VERY HIGH YIELD. THIS IS A SUBJECT WHICH COULD ALSO BE DISCUSSED BY THE EXPERTS.

FINALLY, I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT THERE ARE OTHER IMPORTANT ASPECTS TO THE EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF EXCAVATION PNEs. WE DISCUSSED THESE IN THE LAST ROUND AND WILL RETURN TO THEM. THE EXPERTS IN THEIR MEETINGS SHOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO ALL OF THESE POINTS. END TEXT

4. BUCHHEIM: BEGIN TEXT:

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MR. TIMERBAEV, THE U.S. SIDE HAS A PROPOSAL TO OFFER CONCERNING AN APPROACH TO INITIAL TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS.

WE PROPOSE THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING SCHEME:

- (1) THAT THE TECHNICAL TOPICS BE GROUPED INTO A FEW GENERAL CATEGORIES.
- (2) THAT EACH OF THESE GENERAL CATEGORIES OF TECHNICAL TOPICS BE EXAMINED IN WORKING MEETINGS AMONG A FEW SPECIALISTS FROM EACH OF THE TWO SIDES.
- (3) THAT THESE MEETINGS OF SPcIALISTS BE HELD CONCURRENTLY TO THE EXTENT PRACTICABLE.

US POINTS ON DISCUSSIONS OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE

(1) THE DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT WILL DEAL WITH ITEMS OF INFORMATION TO BE EXCHANGED CONCERNING THE PURPOSE OR PURPOSES OF A PNE AND TO SUPPORT VERIFICATION OF YIELD OF BOTH CONTAINED AND EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS THROUGH TELESEISMIC MEASUREMENTS. INFORMATION EXCHANGE FOR OTHER PURPOSES WILL BE CONSIDERED AS PARTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS OF THOSE OTHER PURPOSES.

(2) IT WILL BE ASSUMED IN THESE DISCUSSIONS THAT ALL INFORMATION TO BE EXCHANGED FOR VERIFICATION PURPOSES WILL BE VALID. THE MATTER OF INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION OF EXCHANGED INFORMATION WILL BE DISCUSSED IN DELIBERATIONS ON FUNCTIONS OF OBSERVATION.

(3) THE EXPERTS WILL FIRST ADDRESS INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS NEAR THE AGREED LIMIT ON YIELD AND WILL IDENTIFY ANY DIFFERENCES IN INFORMATION NEEDS NEAR 100 KILOTONS AND NEAR 150 KILOTONS. THE EXPERTS WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO DECIDE WHETHER THE LIMIT SHOULD BE 100 KILOTONS OR 150 KILOTONS.

(4) SUBSEQUENTLY THE EXPERTS WILL EXAMINE INFORMATION NEEDS IN THE RANGE OF YIELDS BELOW 50-70 KILOTONS.

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(4) THAT THE SPECIALISTS REPORT TO THE PLENARY BODY ON A SCHEDULE TO BE SET BY THE PLENARY BODY.

WE WOULD EXPECT THAT THE SPECIALISTS WOULD, AS BOTH SIDES AGREED LAST WEEK, REVIEW THE RECORD OF LAST WEEK'S MEETINGS AND IDENTIFY ALL TOPICS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CATEGORIES THAT WERE MENTIONED FOR REVIEW.

TO COMPLETE OUR PROPOSAL WE HAVE IDENTIFIED THREE CATEGORIES OF TECHNICAL TOPICS WHICH SEEM TO US TO BE REASONABLE AND WE HAVE PREPARED SOME BRIEF POINTS CONCERNING JOINT TECHNICAL EXAMINATIONS IN EACH OF THESE CATEGORIES.

THE CATEGORIES AND POINTS, FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION, ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(5) THE EXPERTS SHOULD BASE THEIR WORK ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE FOLLOWING ITEMS OF INFORMATION WILL BE EXCHANGED FOR ALL PNES REGARDLESS OF YIELD: (I) THE FACT THAT THEN PNE WILL BE CARRIED OUT, (II) DATE, (III) TIME OF DAY, (IV) GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES, (V) AGGREGATE YIELD, AND (CI) PEACEFUL PURPOSE.

(6) INITIAL TASKS TO BE TAKEN UP BY THE EXPERTS ARE:

(A) ADD TO THE LIST PRESENTED BY THE US SIDE ON
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JUNE 5, 1975, ANY ITEMS OF INFORMATION THAT THE SOVIET SIDE MAY WISH TO INCLUDE FOR CONSIDERATION.

(B) IDENTIFY ALL ITEMS ON THE CONSOLIDATED LIST THAT ARE ADVOCATED BY BOTH SIDES AND ESTABLISH FORMULATIONS OF EACH ITEM TO ASSURE THAT THEY CONVEY IDENTICAL MEANING TO BOTH SIDES.

(C) EXAMINE THE BASIS FOR LACK OF AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO EACH ITEM FOR WHICH CLEAR AGREEMENT DOES NOT EXIST.

(D) MAKE A PRELIMINARY REPORT TO PLENARY ON WEDNESDAY.

U.S. POINTS ON DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION OF YIELDS OF INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS IN GROUP EXPLOSIONS BY CLOSE-IN MEASUREMENTS OF DYNAMIC SHOCK

(1) THE DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT WILL DEAL WITH PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF YIELD VERIFICATION THROUGH MEASUREMENTS OF DYNAMIC SHOCK FROM INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS IN GROUPS. TWO GENERAL APPROACHES HAVE BEEN SUGGESTED: THE USE OF GROUND MOTION INSTRUMENTATION ON THE SURFACE OR IN INSTRU-

MENT HOLES, AND SLIFER MEASUREMENTS ON HYDRODYNAMIC SHOCK POSITION VERSUS TIME.

(2) TOPICS TO BE EXAMINED WILL INCLUDE, BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO, THE FOLLOWING:

- (A) PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES;
- (B) INSTRUMENTS;
- (C) INSTRUMENT EMPLACEMENT;
- (D) CONDITIONS THAT MUST BE IMPOSED ON GROUP EXPLOSIONS AND THE PHYSICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPLOSIONS AND INSTRUMENTS;
- (E) INFORMATION TO BE EXCHANGED;
- (F) METHODS FOR DETERMINING YIELDS FROM MEASUREMENTS;
- (G) UNCERTAINTIES TO BE EXPECTED IN YIELD DETERMINATIONS; AND
- (H) FIELD REQUIREMENTS FOR INSTALLATION OF ALL EQUIPMENT AND RECORDING OF THE DATA FROM SUCH INSTRUMENTATION.

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(3) IT WILL BE ASSUMED IN THESE DISCUSSIONS THAT ALL INFORMATION TO BE EXCHANGED TO SUPPORT MEASUREMENTS AND YIELD DETERMINATIONS WILL BE VALID. THE MATTER OF INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION OF EXCHANGED INFORMATION WILL BE DISCUSSED IN DELIBERATIONS ON FUNCTIONS OF OBSERVATION.

(4) EXAMINATION, UNDER ITEM 2(D) AND ITEM 2(F), OF CONDITIONS THAT MUST BE IMPOSED ON GROUP EXPLOSIONS WILL INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF LIMITATIONS ON AGGREGATE YIELD.

(5) THE EXPERTS WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO DECIDE WHAT APPROACH SHOULD BE ADOPTED FOR YIELD VERIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS IN GROUPS.

(6) THE EXPERTS WILL MAKE A PRELIMINARY REPORT TO PLENARY ON THURSDAY.

US POINTS ON DISCUSSIONS OF EXCAVATION TECHNICAL TOPICS

(1) THE DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT WILL DEAL WITH VERIFICATION OF LIMITATIONS ON EXCAVATION PNEs.

(2) TOPICS TO BE EXAMINED WILL INCLUDE, BUT WLLL NOT BE LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING:

- (A) VERIFICATION OF YIELDS OF INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS FROM CRATER DIMENSIONS;
- (B) VERIFICATION OF A FISSION-YIELD LIMITATION;
- (C) INFORMATION TO BE EXCHANGED;
- (D) CONDITIONS THAT MUST BE IMPOSED ON EMPLACEMENTS,

ON DISTANCES BETWEEN NEIGHBORING EXPLOSIONS, ON
GEMOETRICAL PATTERN OF GROUPS OF EXPLOSIONS,
OR ON OTHER FACTORS, IN ORDER TO ENABLE EFFECTIVE
FUNCTIONING OF VERIFICATION METHODS;

(E) UNCERTAINTIES TO BE EXPECTED IN VERIFYING
PARAMETERS PLACED UNDER LIMITATIONS; AND

(F) FIELD PROCEDURES AND EQUIPMENT TO IMPLEMENT
VERIFICATION MOTHODS.

(3) IT WILL BE ASSUMED IN THESE DISCUSSIONS THAT ALL INFORMATION
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TO BE EXCHANGED FOR VERIFICATION PURPOSES WILL BE VALID.
THE MATTER OF INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION OF EXCHANGED
INFORMATION WILL BE DISCUSSED IN DELIBERATIONS ON FUNCTIONS
OF OBSERVATION.

(4) EXAMINATION, UNDER ITEM 2(D), OF CONDITIONS THAT
MUST BE IMPOSED ON EXCAVATION PNES WILL INCLUDE
CONSIDERATON OF LIMITATIONS ON AGGREATE YIELD.

(5) THE EXPERTS WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO DECIDE WHAT APPROACHES
TO VERIFICATION SHOULD BE ADPOTED.

(6) THE EXPERTS WILL MAKE A PRELMINARY REPORT TO
PLENARY ON FRIDAY. END TEXT.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, MEETING DELEGATIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 JUN 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ShawDG
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975MOSCOW07953
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750200-0712
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750668/aaaackjv.tel
Line Count: 362
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ShawDG
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 24 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <24 APR 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <28 OCT 2003 by ShawDG>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS PLENARY NUMBER SIX TTBT/PNE DELEGATION MESSAGE NUMBER FIFTEEN
TAGS: PARM, US, UR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006